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PANEL
STRADDLING THE FENCE BETWEEN TRUTH AND
PRETENSE: THE ROLE OF LAW AND PREFERENCE
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND THE FUTURE
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCEt
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH*
In this Essay, I begin by describing two contrasting models of
judicial decision making. The traditional, law-based model posits
that judges, if left to their own devices, will do their best to
uphold the rule of law, and to that end, judicial independence is
necessary to protect the decisions they make from external inter-
ference. The emerging, preference-based model, on the other
hand, posits that independent judges exploit their independence
by implementing their personal attitudes or values with no partic-
ular regard for the rule of law. I will then explain how contempo-
rary debates on such issues as judicial selection, the regulation of
judicial speech, the optimal rules for judicial disqualification,
and the general relationship between judicial independence and
accountability are animated by these contrasting models of judi-
cial decision making. I accept a widely shared, common sense
view that the dichotomy between law-based and preference-based
models is a false one, in that law and preferences both play a role
in judicial decision making. I argue, however, that the legal estab-
lishment has been reluctant to depart from the script of the law-
based model for fear that doing so will undermine the primary
justification for independence (by conceding that independent
judges do more than simply follow the law when they decide
cases). I argue that there may be other justifications for judicial
independence that ought to hold sway in a world where judicial
decision making involves a complex interplay between law and
t On March 12, 2008, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
hosted a panel discussion entitled, "Judicial Accountability: Experiments in the
States." Prof. Geyh's remarks have been revised for publication.
* John F. Kimberling Chair in Law, Indiana University School of Law at
Bloomington. I would like to thank David Pimentel for his comments on an
earlier draft.
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preference-justifications that liberate judges and lawyers to
speak more candidly about the role preferences play in judicial
decision making without conceding the need to curtail judicial
autonomy in untoward ways. If we can move toward a broader
consensus on what judges do when they decide cases, it may
enable more meaningful engagement on such issues as judicial
selection, speech, disqualification, independence, and
accountability.
I. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW: LAW-BASED DECISION MAKING
The role of the judge, as traditionally conceived, is discrete
and limited. Federal and state constitutions separate and circum-
scribe judicial power: legislators make laws; governors execute
laws; judges interpret laws. Ifjudicial power is not separated from
legislative, wrote Montesquieu, "the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be
then the legislator."'1 Ifjudicial power is not separated from exec-
utive, he continued, "the judge might behave with violence and
oppression."2
Judicial power, so separated and circumscribed, makes it
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is," to borrow Chief Justice John Marshall's
well-worn phrase.' To ensure that judges say what the law is,
rather than what others in a position to control the judge want
the law to be, conventional wisdom dating back to the founding
posits that judges should possess a measure of independence
from the other branches of government and the people they
represent.4 If they are insulated from external sources of interfer-
ence with their impartial judgment, the traditional argument
goes, otherwise capable and honorable judges will uphold the
rule of law.
1. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 152 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing 1949) (1748).
2. Id.
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). Hamilton argued:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I under-
stand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority.... Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts ofjustice, whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Consti-
tution void.
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Today, this traditional understanding of the judicial role, in
which independent judges uphold the rule of law through the
exercise of impartial judgment, is reaffirmed by the oath of office
that federal and state judges take: federal judges, for example,
must swear to "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all the duties incumbent upon [them] as [judges] under the
Constitution and laws of the United States."5 Moreover, at the
state level, it is enforced through codes of conduct that judges
ignore on pain of discipline or removal. Rule 1.2 of the 2007
Model Code of Judicial Conduct declares that a judge "shall act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary .. ,"6
Rule 2.2 provides that judges "shall uphold and apply the law,
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impar-
tially."7 A comment accompanying Rule 2.2 explains that,
"[a]lthough each judge comes to the bench with a unique back-
ground and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and
apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or
disapproves of the law in question."' Rule 2.4(A) states that a
judge "shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism,"
while Rule 2.4(B) states that "a judge shall not permit family,
social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment."9
The norms embedded in the oath of office and codes of
conduct pervade our political culture and conjure the image of
judges as detached and neutral arbiters of rules in contests
between combatants-an image perpetuated with the metaphor
of judge as umpire or referee. As Chief Justice John Roberts
explained during his confirmation testimony: 'Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them."'" And
in 1998, Justice John Paul Stevens employed the umpire meta-
phor in defense of judicial independence, when he told a Chi-
cago audience that:
The thousands and thousands of Cub fans who have
repeatedly visited Wrigley Field undoubtedly know much
more about the rules of baseball and the ability of National
League umpires to apply them fairly than most voters know
about the law and the qualifications of judges of the Cir-
5. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).
6. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr R. 1.2 (2007).
7. Id. 2.2.
8. Id. cmt.
9. Id. 2.4.
10. David G. Savage, Roberts Sees Role as Judicial "Umpire," L.A. Times, Sept.
13, 2005, at Al.
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cuit Court of Cook County. Nevertheless, I think you would
agree that the home-team fans should not have the oppor-
tunity to hire and fire umpires."1
II. THE EMERGING VIEW: PREFERENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING
The legal realism movement of the 1920s challenged the
traditional view that judges were essentially value-neutral auto-
matons who mechanically divined and applied the true meaning
of the law. Rather, legal realists asserted that judges are influ-
enced by their education, upbringing, ambitions, experiences,
and values to no less an extent than anyone else. 12 And they
sought to debunk the notion that law is somehow transcendental
and therefore inherently known or knowable.1 3
In the years since, political scientists have elaborated upon
the judicial role as first described by the realists. One highly
influential cohort-devotees of the so-called "attitudinal
model"-maintains that law is functionally irrelevant to judges
who "make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light
of their ideological attitudes and values."1 4 From the perspective
of the attitudinalist then, an ironic consequence of judicial inde-
11. Molly McDonough, U.S. Justice No Fan of Picking Judges by Ballot, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 17, 1998, at 1, 22.
12. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think,
Address Before the San Francisco Bar Association (1925), reprinted in AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM 195, 196 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). Radin argues:
Judges, we know, are people. I know a great many. Some were my
school-mates .... They eat the same foods, seem moved by the same
emotions, and laugh at the same jokes. Apparently they are a good
deal like ourselves. If, therefore, in a controversy in which we are
engaged, we could rid ourselves of the personal interest in it, we might
shrewdly guess that a great many judges would like to see the same
person win who appeals to us.
Id.
13. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1930), reprinted in AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 13, at 205, 206-07. Frank writes:
Myth-making and fatherly lies must be abandoned-the Santa Claus
story of complete legal certainty; the fairy tale of a pot of golden law
which is already in existence and which the good lawyer can find, if
only he is sufficiently diligent; the phantasy of an aesthetically satisfac-
tory system and harmony, consistent and uniform, which will spring
up when we find the magic wand of rationalizing principle.
Id.
14. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ArrI-
TUDINAL MODEL 73 (1993).
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pendence is to undermine the rule of law by liberating judges to
implement their personal preferences without fear of reprisal. 5
A second group, sometimes loosely characterized as "neo-
institutionalists,"' 6 use the attitudinal model as a starting point,
but add that judges are influenced by more than their political
attitudes: some posit that judges think strategically when decid-
ing cases (by, for example, taking what the legislators or gover-
nors will think into account); 7 others argue that judges are
influenced by historical, legal, and political culture, which con-
strains the values judges implement and shapes what those values
are;" still others argue that judges are influenced by their vari-
ous audiences, such as colleagues, lawyers, media, legislators, vot-
ers, and so on.19 While many scholars falling within the neo-
institutionalist camp acknowledge the relevance of law to judicial
decision making, they reject the traditional view that law is the
sole or even a primary determinant of judicial behavior.
In short, attitudinalists characterize judicial decision making
as preferences animated by personal values. The neo-institution-
alists characterize it as preferences driven by values-plus (strate-
gic thinking, cultural or historical norms, audiences the judge
seeks to impress, and so on). Either way, however, it is judicial
preferences rather than law that better explains case outcomes.
There are signs that preference-based models of judicial
decision making are winning acceptance outside of academia.
When the media report on key decisions of state and federal
supreme courts, it has become common if not conventional to
explain the decision with explicit reference to the political or
partisan orientation of the judges in the majority and minority-
often before reporting on the court's legal reasoning. The impli-
cation is obvious enough: whether the judge's political prefer-
ences are conservative or liberal is as, if not more, important to
15. Id. at 69 ("Members of the Supreme Court further their policy goals
because they lack electoral or political accountability, ambition for higher
office, and comprise a court of last resort that controls its own jurisdiction.").
16. See Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes:
Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECI-
SION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 6-7 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
17. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 18
(1998).
18. See generally THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITU-
TIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999);
Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism, "and the Future of
Public Law, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89 (1988).
19. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 25-49 (2006).
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understanding why a judge made a particular decision as the rea-
sons the judge gave for making that decision.
On a related front, the ongoing campaign against 'judicial
activism" is driven by a suspicion that underlies the attitudinal
model: independent judges disregard the law and implement
their personal values. Such sentiments have begun to gain trac-
tion among the general public, as reflected in polling data show-
ing majority support for the proposition thatjudicial activism has
reached a crisis point and that, while judges say they are follow-
ing the law, they often base decisions on their feelings.2z At the
same time, however, the campaign against activist judges under-
scores the tenacity of the traditional model, albeit in a back-
handed way. To the extent that judges engage in preference-
based decision making that is disconnected from the law, it is not
perceived as business as usual, as political scientists posit. Rather,
it is a "crisis" in immediate need of a solution that typically calls
for the imposition of greater external controls on judicial deci-
sion making.
III. THE DECISION-MAKING MODELS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO ONGOING DEBATES OVER THE REGULATION OF
JUDGES AND THE JUDICIARY
At bottom, the seemingly disparate and intractable debates
over the optimal method of judicial selection, the propriety of
restrictions on judicial speech, the future of judicial disqualifica-
tion, and, more generally, the striking of a proper balance
between judicial independence and accountability are closely
linked to a fundamental disagreement over which model of judi-
cial decision making-the law-based model or the preference-
based model-better describes what judges do.
A. Judicial Selection
The contemporary debate over judicial selection is about
many things, but at its core the issue of whether to appoint or
electjudges turns on whether independentjudges can be trusted
to follow the law.2 Traditionalists who trust judges to follow the
20. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees "Judicial Activism Crisis," ABA J. E-
REPORT, Sept. 30, 2005.
21. This was not always so. Scholars who have studied the judicial election
movement of the mid-nineteenth century found that the movement was
spearheaded by lawyers in state constitutional conventions who believed that
elections would promote judicial independence by ending the dependence of
judges on the governors or legislators who appointed them. See Kermit L. Hall,
Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of
State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 345, 347-48;
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law typically favor appointive systems which distance judges from
the majoritarian influence of elections. Those who do not-
either because they worry that too often judges will go rogue
unless they are held accountable to the electorate, or because
declaring what the law is is an expression of policy preference
that voters in a democratic republic have a right to influence-
typically favor judicial elections.22
B. Restrictions on Judicial Speech
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White held that judicial candi-
dates have a First Amendment right to announce their views on
disputed legal issues that may come before them later as
judges.2" The decision has emboldened interest groups to draft
questionnaires for judicial candidates that ask the candidates for
their views on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, capital pun-
ishment, and gun control.24 Those who applaud these develop-
ments argue that the value-based preferences of judicial
candidates are highly relevant to the decisions they will make as
judges, and thus voters have both a right and a need to know
them. White critics, on the other hand, subscribe to the tradi-
tional view and argue that the judge's personal views are irrele-
vant to what the law demands; moreover, from their perspective,
judges who take firm positions on issues that will come before
them later impliedly commit to deciding those cases in a manner
consistent with their previously stated preferences, which is anti-
thetical to the principle that judges must remain open minded
and follow the law on a case-by-case basis.
Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 224 (1993). In the
current debate, however, election proponents focus upon accountability to the
electorate and not independence from the political branches. See, e.g., James
Bopp, Jr., PreservingJudicial Independence:Judicial Elections as the Antidote to Judicial
Activism, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 180 (2007) (focusing on the policy-making role
ofjudges); Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE 165, 166 (MatthewJ. Streb ed., 2007).
22. I do not want to overstate the point. There are others-most notably,
elected judges-who make other arguments in support of judicial elections:
electing judges adds to the judiciary's institutional legitimacy and thereby pro-
motes public confidence in the courts, elections bring judges closer to the peo-
ple they serve, and elections are how we select public officials in a democracy.
23. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002).
24. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 21, at 73, 84.
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C. Judicial Disqualification
Under English common law, courts did not recognize dis-
qualification for bias-let alone the appearance of bias. Judges
had taken an oath to uphold the law impartially, and for a judge
to concede disqualifying bias in a given case was tantamount to
conceding an inability to honor his oath.2 5 As one commentator
wrote in 1947: "Disqualification for bias represents a complete
departure from common law principles. ' 26 Over the course of
the twentieth century, however, the realist suspicion that judges
are susceptible to the same prejudices that afflict the rest of us
gradually led to an expansion of disqualification rules and
culminated in the ABA's promulgation of the 1972 Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, which required disqualification not only for
bias, but also for apparent bias (whenever a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned").27 The realist sentiments
underlying the 1972 disqualification rule do not lead inexorably
to the conclusion that judges who may be influenced by their
value preferences are unable to be fundamentally fair and impar-
tial but do point toward a realization that such judges can be
overtaken by their preferences and become fundamentally unfair
and partial. Despite nearly universal adoption of the ABA stan-
dard in the years since, many judges cling to the traditional view
and remain highly ambivalent about conceding bias or apparent
bias,28 which has given rise to several recent, highly publicized
episodes in which judges have declined to disqualify themselves
in the teeth of widespread criticism. The most notorious exam-
ple, perhaps, is Supreme CourtJustice Antonin Scalia's refusal to
disqualify himself from hearing a case in which Vice President
Dick Cheney was a party, after accepting an invitation to go duck-
hunting with the Vice President while the case was pending.29
D. The Judicial Independence-Accountability Debate
Ultimately, then, much depends on the empirical question
of what it is that judges do. In a recent paper, David Pimentel
argues that how much structural independence a state should
give its judges-and correspondingly how much structural con-
25. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *361.
26. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 618-19
(1947).
27. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1972).
28. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
1-2 (1995).
29. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 914, 929 (2004)
(memorandum of Scalia, J.).
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trol it should exert over those judges-is not an issue to be
resolved in the abstract, but is one that turns on how judges in
that state conduct themselves.3" A judiciary that is typified by
"monsters" who would subvert the rule of law must be controlled
with limited concern for its independence; a judiciary whose
judges are corruptible or well intentioned but still susceptible to
misbehavior must be given the structural independence needed
to do the right thing without inappropriate interference, while
reserving the accountability stick for judges who stray; finally, a
judiciary populated with "heroes" who will resist outside pressure
as well as the temptation to follow a personal agenda can safely
be afforded a high degree of structural independence with only
limited concern for accountability."' The traditional, law-based
model ofjudicial decision making in the United States features a
more optimistic appraisal of what judges do. It calls for more
structural independence and less structural accountability than
preference-based models do, which posit that independence
begets lawlessness that states might logically seek to control.
IV. IN SEARCH OF A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN LAW-BASED AND
PREFERENCE-BASED MODELS
The law-based and preference-based decision-making
dichotomy, while useful to understanding the tensions that per-
vade the regulation and oversight of judicial systems, is grossly
exaggerated if not downright false. To say that law is utterly irrel-
evant to judges and judicial decision making, as some political
scientists do, is to fixate (as most attitudinal studies do) on the
eighty hotly-contested, policy-driven cases the Supreme Court of
the United States decides each year to virtual exclusion of the
other one hundred million cases filed across the United States,
where claims that "the law constrains nothing" are exceedingly
difficult if not impossible to defend. And as several academic law-
yers (myself included) have argued, preference-based, attitudinal
studies can often be faulted for defining and operationalizing
"law" in unjustifiably limited ways.32 Constrained definitions of
law may serve to disprove law's relevance to judicial decision
30. David Pimentel, Beyond and Beneath "Independence" and "Accountability"
Adapting Judicial Structure to Leverage Judges' Courage and Integrity, 56 CLE. ST. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008).
31. Id.
32. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE
279-82 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 24-26 (Stephen
B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously,
4 PERSPECrIvES ON POLITICS 261 (2006); Michael Gerhardt, Attitudes About Atti-
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making (by making "law" a clearly, if narrowly, defined variable,
the limited scope of which marginalizes its impact on judicial
decisions relative to extra-legal considerations), but do so at the
expense of ignoring the flexibility and nuance of the "law" as it is
commonly understood and employed by judges and lawyers.
Thus, proponents of preference-based models may fairly be
accused of not taking law seriously enough.
The legal establishment, on the other hand, may just as
fairly be criticized for taking law too seriously by clinging to and
proselytizing the fiction that judicial decision making can be
explained with reference to law alone. In an age when "[w]e are
all legal realists now,"33 it is too late in the day to pretend that
when judges adjudicate disputes between adversaries, both of
whom support their positions with credible-seeming legal argu-
ments, the value preferences of the judges never factor into the
choices they make. Attitudinal studies can be faulted, but they
furnish compelling evidence that judicial value preferences
matter.
All of which is to say that Barry Friedman probably got it
right when he wrote: "[M] ost likely there is agreement that atti-
tudes and law both play a role-the question is how much, and
more particularly, how much law can constrain. To state this dif-
ferently, the question is not so much whether law plays a role, as
what role it plays."34 The disputants, however, remain unwilling
to meet halfway. Friedman himself has ably critiqued the "almost
pathological" reluctance of some political scientists to take law
seriously.3 5 Of more immediate interest and concern to me, how-
ever, is why judges remain comparably reluctant to take extra-
legal influences on judicial decision making seriously.
At some level, every law student, lawyer, and judge under-
stands that ajudge's values can influence the choices that ajudge
makes and that judicial decision making cannot always be
explained with reference to legal doctrine alone; indeed, Judge
Patricia Wald has characterized the legal profession's reactions to
the findings of political science studies as "ho-hum."36 But when
judges take to the podium to defend judicial independence, dis-
cuss its relationship to the rule of law, and explain the role
tudes, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1733 (2003) (reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLDJ.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)).
33. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 467
(1988).
34. Friedman, supra note 32, at 264.
35. Id.
36. Patricia Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 235,
236 (1999).
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judges play in the administration of justice, the party line
remains superficial and unyielding. One judge writes that 'judi-
cial independence is an essential cornerstone of the rule of
law,"37 for reasons that a second judge explains: "[i]t is judicial
independence that ensures that judges are free to honor their
oaths, free to follow the Rule of Law, and free to dispense justice
by a decision-making process, rather than an outcome-oriented
process.""8 A third judge tells us there is a "vital relationship
between judicial independence and the rule of law,"3 in which, a
fourth judge elaborates, independence enables ajudge to decide
cases "fairly, impartially, and according to the facts and law, not
according to whim, prejudice, or fear, the dictates of the legisla-
ture or executive, or the latest opinion poll."4 Justice Stephen
Breyer has made the same point that 'judicial independence
revolves around the theme of how to assure that judges decide
according to law, rather than according to their own whims or
the will of the political branches of government. 41
Why, then, is there a seeming disconnection between the
rhetoric of whatjudges publicly say (that independent judges fol-
low the law, without regard to their "whims"), and the reality of
what judges less publicly acknowledge (we are not stupid-we
know that the decisions of independent judges are influenced by
their value preferences)? If upholding the rule of law is the pri-
mary, if not the sole justification judges offered for preserving
their independence, then conceding that independent judges do
more (or less) than uphold the law when they decide cases
undercuts the primary justification for their independence. To
the extent that judges acknowledge the influence of policy pref-
erences in judicial decision making, then, it undermines the
traditional legal model and plays into the hands of court critics
who claim that "activist" judges abuse their independence by dis-
regarding the law and "legislating from the bench" and must
therefore forfeit their independence and be subject to greater
political control. And so, judges intent on preserving their inde-
pendence stick to a rule of law script.
37. Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, JUDGESJ., Fall 2007, at 16,
20.
38. Julie A. Robinson,Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the
Role of the Judiciary, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 544 (2007).
39. Louraine C. Arkfeld, The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary,
JUDGESJ., Fall 2007, at 12, 12.
40. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on
Judicial Independence, 64 OHio ST. L.J. 3, 3 (2003).
41. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996).
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Not very long ago, I wrote that if 'judges employ law as a
shill to conceal nakedly political decision making of a sort best
reserved for Congress or the people, then insulating such deci-
sion making from the influence of Congress or the people
becomes largely indefensible. '42 I stand by those words, at least
in a qualified way, but they conjure the image of a judge that few
(save an especially vested contingent of the political science com-
munity) would say is readily found in nature. In the minds of
most, judicial decisions are influenced by law and personal pref-
erences in complex and varying combinations. If, however, we
proceed from the premise that judicial independence exists for
the sole purpose of promoting the "rule of law," conventionally
understood, then once it is conceded that independent judges
do not simply follow the law, the rationale for judicial indepen-
dence is diminished or obliterated. But is the premise sound? In
other words, can judicial independence be defended in a world
where the judge's personal values or policy preferences influence
the decisions that ajudge makes? It seems to me that it can, for a
number of reasons.
First, to the extent that a judge's policy preferences merely
color her interpretation of the law, the rule of law justification
for judicial independence remains intact. For example, a con-
servative judge and a liberal judge may interpret the meaning of
the freedom of speech in predictably different ways, but the tex-
tual weave of the law is open enough to accommodate such dif-
fering interpretations without doing violence to the proposition
that both judges are doing their best to follow the law. In such
scenarios, the judges in question are, from their point of view,
interpreting the law as they construe it to be written.43 Insulating
these judges from external interference with the choices they
make can thus be defended with reference to more traditional
rule of law arguments. Granted, value preferences influence case
outcomes, but the universe of possible outcomes is constrained
and channeled by legal text and precedent thatjudicial indepen-
dence protects against encroachment.
Second, to the extent that we propose to exercise greater
political control over judges who sometimes follow the law and
sometimes implement their preferences, the question becomes
whether the benefit of curbing the independence of judges to
implement their political preferences exceeds the cost of curbing
their independence to uphold the rule of law in the teeth of
political resistance. This scenario is slightly different from that
42. GEYH, supra note 32, at 281.
43. See, e.g., id. at 279.
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posited in connection with the first point, because here we
assume that judges sometimes knowingly depart from the rule of
law to further their value preferences. The operative issue, then,
is not whether the rule of law is all that matters to judges when
they decide cases, but whether it matters enough to justify the
retention of structural protections for judicial independence.
Third, upholding the rule of law is not the only instrumental
value that judicial independence arguably furthers. Impartiality
is another. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines imparti-
ality as the "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of
an open mind in considering issues that may come before the
judge."4 4 Judicial independence buffers judges from external
pressures that the political branches, the electorate, the media,
interest groups, or even the parties might otherwise seek to
impose. Such pressures could bias the judge against a party or
cause and thereby impair the judge's capacity to adjudicate that
case fairly. At the same time, judicial independence may liberate
judges to act on their individual biases without fear of reprisal, to
the detriment of impartiality. And so, one possibility is to ask
whether the impartiality that judicial independence arguably
facilitates offsets the partiality that it arguably insulates. Another
possibility is to preserve judicial independence from external
threats to impartiality while augmenting internal checks (such as
appellate review, disqualification standards, and disciplinary
processes) to discourage threats to impartiality posed by the
judges themselves.
Fourth, and in a vein related to the preceding point, judicial
independence may be defended as a means to further fair or due
process.4" As Professor Edward Rubin has explained, "Due pro-
cess does not demand that decisions exclude public policy con-
siderations or require that they flow logically and definitively
from applicable rules. But it does demand a certain type of deci-
sion making, specifically decision making that is constrained by
the established procedural protections. " " Independence, the
argument goes, "is a mechanism that is designed to ensure that a
decision maker provides the due process protection of a decision
on the record . . .by restricting various kinds of signals from
various governmental units or private parties."4 7 In other words,
judicial independence ensures adherence to a fair process by
44. MODEL CODE OFJUDIcLAL CONDUCT Terminology at 6 (2007).
45. Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 32, at 56, 70.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 71.
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insulating that process from corruption by interested outsiders,
regardless of whether the judges themselves slavishly adhere to
formalistic rules or interpret the law more flexibly in light of
their own policy preferences.
Fifth, judicial independence can be defended on the
grounds that it promotes institutional competence. Unlike legis-
lators and governors, judges of general jurisdiction in every state
must, as a matter of constitutional or statutory law, be trained
lawyers, often with a specified number of years in practice prior
to ascending the bench.48 The assumption implicit in such
requirements is that the business of judging requires specialized
training. To the extent that judges make "policy," it is policy
made in the context of specific cases and controversies that is so
closely intertwined with the interpretation of existing law that
expertise in the law is needed to do the job well. Judicial inde-
pendence arguably facilitates competent and conscientious deci-
sion making by enabling judges to ply their expertise
unencumbered by excessive external interference.
Sixth, one can argue that judicial independence remains
necessary to preserve public confidence in the courts. This argu-
ment can be advanced in either of two ways. First, public confi-
dence in the institutions of government is an end in itself in
democratic republics that depend for their legitimacy on the
consent of the governed. The willingness of people in such
republics to acquiesce to governmental control turns on whether
they believe that their government is subject to the rule of law.
To the extent that law continues to matter to judges-even if
preferences matter too-judicial independence preserves public
confidence in the capacity of the legal system to encourage the
rule of law and eschew the rule of the mob or the politically pow-
erful.4" Second, and on a more cynical note, even if the rule of
law is an absolute myth, and in reality judges exploit their inde-
pendence by satiating their political appetites at every turn, it is
still an important myth that preserves public confidence in the
courts and thereby ensures acquiescence in the orderly adminis-
tration ofjustice. Judicial independence, in turn, is a cornerstone
in the rule of law myth that cannot be removed without destroy-
ing the myth that is critical to maintaining public order.5 °
48. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,
59 n.71 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, TheJudgment of the Boss on Bossing the
Judges: Bruce Springsteen, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 14 WIDENER
L.J. 885, 902-05 (2005).
50. See, e.g., James Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme
Courts: Legitimacy Theory and "New Style, "JUD. CAMPAIGNS, Mar. 21, 2007, at 5-6
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This has been a thought piece in which I do not presume or
pretend to fully develop any particular justification for judicial
independence. My point is simply to suggest the possibility that
in a world where law and preferences both play a role in judicial
decision making, judicial independence can still be defended on
a variety of grounds. If such an argument is accepted, it may be
possible to have more meaningful, interdisciplinary discussions
about what judges do: to concede that preferences matter is not
to concede that law is irrelevant or that judicial independence is
anathema, which may liberate judges and lawyers to speak more
openly and candidly about the complexity and nuance of the
judicial role. That, in turn, may facilitate finding middle ground
in ongoing debates over judicial selection, judicial speech, judi-
cial disqualification, and judicial independence and
accountability.
In other words, if we accept that the truth about what judges
do is likely to involve law and preference, and that judicial inde-
pendence may retain value in this middle ground, then it
becomes possible to be less absolutist in other areas as well. For
example, it may make more sense to talk about which judicial
selection system is best suited to serve the needs of a given state
with a given political culture at a given time than to assume one
size fits all and argue that one selection system must be optimal
for everyone. 5 When it comes to judicial speech, it may be possi-
ble to acknowledge that the public has a right and need to know
about the personal, judicial, and political philosophy of prospec-
tive judges (because values matter in judicial decision making),
at the same time future litigants have the right and need to know
that their judges are not pre-committed to reaching particular
results before they have had an opportunity to plead their cases
(because law matters too). Through use of disqualification and
recusal, judges can worry less about living up to the myth of per-
fect impartiality and concede occasional bias or apparent bias
when it arises-to the ultimate benefit of public confidence in
the courts. And in the general debate about judicial indepen-
dence and accountability, it may enable discussions to proceed as
(discussing the "rule of law myth" and its relationship to public confidence in
the courts).
51. The middle ground I am seeking here represents a departure from
the more strident position I took in categorical opposition to judicial elections
several years ago. See Geyh, supra note 49. Although I remain skeptical of judi-
cial elections as a general matter, I am less interested in being doctrinaire than
being right, and have concluded that divining the optimal method of judicial
selection is best undertaken when considering a specific jurisdiction in light of
its specific problems and political culture.
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less of a zero-sum game and rather as one in which indepen-
dence and accountability are both welcome in measures dictated
by the problems and needs of the given jurisdiction.
